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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Third District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Utah. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(j) and § 78-2-2(4) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err by making factual determinations in dismissing 
Sony's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, were the factual allegations 
of the Complaint sufficient to state a claim that the Rebers had guaranteed the debt of a 
corporation other than defendant Visual Technology? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss, 
the appellate court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those factual allegations in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). The propriety 
of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App 36, ^ 9. 
2. Did the trial court err by dismissing Sony's Complaint where the Rebers 
had failed to revoke their Guaranty, notwithstanding any change in Visual Technology's 
corporate structure or ownership? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). In determining whether a trial court properly granted a 
motion to dismiss, the appellate court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint 
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as true and consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those factual allegations 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
Mule-Hide Products, Inc. v. White, 40 P.3d 1155 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Statement of the Facts 
Sony Electronics Inc. ("Sony") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place 
of business in Park Ridge, New Jersey. Sony engages in the business of selling and 
distributing a variety of electronic products, accessories, and software throughout the 
United States. (R. 1). On August 2, 1986, Sony entered into a Security Agreement with 
Visual Technology, Inc. ("Visual Technology"), a Utah based company which sold, 
rented, installed and repaired video equipment for consumers. (R. 2). At the time the 
Security Agreement was executed, Visual Technology maintained its offices at 2141 S. 
Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. (R. 7). The Security Agreement was executed by 
Erland Reber, then President of Visual Technology. (R. 10). 
Under the Security Agreement, Visual Technology agreed to timely pay for goods 
it purchased from Sony on credit. (R. 2, 7). On September 28, 1989, Erland Reber and 
his wife, Sharlene Reber, (collectively, the "Rebers") signed a Guaranty Agreement (the 
"Guaranty") under which they agreed to guarantee full and prompt payment of Visual 
Technology's debt to Sony. (R. 13-16). At the time the Guaranty was executed, Visual 
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Technology had apparently moved its offices to 2155 S. Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115. (R. 13). 
Section 2 of the Guaranty provides: 
Obligations of Guarantors. To induce the Creditor [Sony] to sell, or agree 
to sell to, or extend or agree to extend credit to the Debtor [Visual 
Technology], and in consideration of the Creditor's doing so, Guarantors 
[the Rebers] do hereby guarantee to the Creditor the full, prompt and 
unconditional payment, upon the due date, of each every debt of the 
Debtor; the full, prompt and unconditional performance of every term and 
condition of any transaction to be kept and performed by the Debtor; and 
the payment of interest on each and every debt of the Debtor. 
(Id.) The Guaranty further provides that the Rebers' obligation to Sony "is an absolute, 
continuing, unconditional and unlimited Guaranty." (Id.) The parties expressly agreed 
that the Guaranty would remain effective despite any subsequent changes to Visual 
Technology's corporate structure, principals, name, or location. (R. 13-14). Specifically, 
Section 3 of the Guaranty provides: 
Character of the Obligation. This Guaranty is an absolute, continuing, 
unconditional and unlimited Guaranty. The term of this Guaranty shall 
commence on the date first above indicated hereof. No termination of this 
Guaranty shall be effected by the death of the Guarantor. This Guaranty 
shall be effective regardless of any subsequent incorporation, 
reorganization, merger or consolidation of the Debtor, change of partners, 
change of name or any other change in the composition, nature, personnel 
or location of the Debtor whatsoever. 
(Id.) (emphasis added). In addition, the Guaranty further provides that the agreement will 
"be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns of the parties." 
(R. 15) 
On or about July 29, 1992, the Rebers sold the assets of Visual Technology to 
Bruce A. Jackson, Dixie Lee Jackson and an entity known as Dunston-Hill, which was 
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owned by the Jacksons. (R. 59) The asset sale was accomplished through an Agreement 
for Sale of Assets (the "Sale Agreement"') executed by the Rebers, Visual Technology, 
the Jacksons, and Dunston-Hill. (R. 59, 75-76). At the time the Sale Agreement was 
executed, Visual Technology was located at 2155 South Main Street address in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and was engaged in the sale and servicing of video, computer, and media 
products. (Id.) 
The Sale Agreement states that the Rebers sold their business as a "going business 
concern" and that the Jacksons intended to continue operating the business at the same 
location and on the same terms. (Id.) Pursuant to the Sale Agreement, the Jacksons 
purchased all of the assets and assumed all of the liabilities of Visual Technology.1 (R. 
60) The terms of the Sale Agreement provided that $200,000.00 of the purchase price 
would be paid by cash and check at closing, while an additional $502,164.00 would be 
paid over a 10 year period through a promissory note bearing 8% interest. (Id.) The 
Rebers do not dispute that Sony was not notified of the asset sale, and did not present any 
evidence showing that Sony knew of the sale. (R. 308, at 5:16-6:19; 18:6-9). 
Article XIV of the Sale Agreement obligated the Rebers to continue operating 
Visual Technology in its normal and customary fashion prior to the Jacksons' taking 
possession. Among other things, Article XIV of the Sale Agreement obligated the 
Rebers to: (i) continue operating Visual Technology at its "customary business hours"; 
(ii) maintain the company's "customary and usual pricing and promotional programs"; 
1
 The Sale Agreement provides for two exceptions: (1) the Rebers retained the right to 
cash on hand at the time of sale; and (2) the Rebers retained the right to tax rebates and 
insurance claims at the time of sale. (R. 60) 
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(iii) "adequately maintain any necessary stock required to maintain the goodwill of the 
business"; and (iv) to refrain from conducting "any liquidation or so-called close -out 
sales." (R. 68). 
On July 31, 1992 - jus t 11 days after the Jacksons purchased the assets of Visual 
Technology - the Jacksons changed the name of Dunston-Hill to Visual Technology, Inc. 
(R. 48). Unaware of the change in ownership, Sony continued to sell goods to Visual 
Technology on credit as it previously had done when the Rebers' owned the business. 
There is no dispute that the Rebers did not notify Sony of their sale of Visual 
Technology's assets at the time of the sale. (R. 308, at 5:16-6:19; 18:6-9). In fact, to 
date, the Rebers have produced no evidence showing that they ever affirmatively notified 
Sony of the asset sale. The record is also completely devoid of any evidence suggesting 
that the Rebers notified Sony of Dunston-Hill's use of Visual Technology's corporate 
name. The record also lacks any evidence that the Rebers revoked their written 
Guaranty, or otherwise informed Sony of their intent to cease doing business. To the 
contrary, the Rebers admit that they did not revoke their Guaranty. (R. 277). 
Unaware of the change in ownership, Sony continued to sell goods to Visual 
Technology on credit for several years. At some point, Visual Technology apparently 
No discovery was conducted in the underlying case concerning the Rebers' 
consent or involvement in the Jacksons' decision to change Dunston-Hill's corporate 
name to "Visual Technology" as the trial court denied Sony's request for discovery. 
Therefore, any allegations beyond those in the Complaint are disputed by Sony. Thus, 
these allegations are presented here only as background and not as uncontested facts. 
3
 Although not part of the trial court's record, the Rebers eventually revoked the 
Guaranty in writing on February 18, 2003, following the trial court's hearing on the 
Rebers' Motion to Dismiss. 
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moved its offices to 474 Bearcat Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.4 Sony and Visual 
Technology also entered into a Reseller Agreement on August 1, 2001, which governed 
Sony's sale of goods to Visual Technology on credit.5 In reliance on the Security 
Agreement, Guaranty Agreement and Reseller Agreement, Sony sold goods on credit to 
Visual Technology through 2001. 
By early 2002, Visual Technology began defaulting on its payment obligations to 
creditors, including Sony. As of January 10, 2002, Visual Technology owed Sony 
$42,481.93 for unpaid invoices, exclusive of interest and collection costs. (R. 3). Sony 
filed its Complaint against Visual Technology6 and the Rebers on April 15, 2002, seeking 
to recover the $42,481.93 owing under the Security Agreement, Guaranty and Reseller 
Agreement. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On June 6, 2002, the Rebers filed a Motion to Dismiss Sony's Complaint, alleging 
that they could not be held liable under the Guaranty because the agreement applied to a 
different corporate debtor - albeit one with the same legal name - and that the debts in 
question were incurred by that different corporate entity. (R. 49) In support of their 
motion, the Rebers attached the Articles of Incorporation for Dunston-Hill, the Sale 
4
 The circumstances surrounding this move, including Sony's knowledge of the change in 
location, were not explored as the trial court denied Sony's request for discovery. 
5
 Again, the circumstances surrounding the parties' negotiations of the Reseller 
Agreement were not explored, as the trial court denied Sony's request for discovery. 
6
 Default Judgment was subsequently entered against Visual Technology on June 22, 
2002. (R.200). 
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Agreement, and certain corporate documents reflecting Dunston-Hill's name change to 
Visual Technology, Inc. (R. 54-79). 
Sony filed its Memorandum in Opposition on June 24, 2002, contending, in part, 
that under Mule-Hide Products, Inc. v. White, 40 P.3d 1155 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), the 
Rebers' Guaranty remained enforceable until revoked in writing, regardless of alleged 
asset sale or change in Visual Technology's corporate structure. (R. 80-88). Sony also 
objected to the Rebers' introduction of evidence outside the pleadings, as the Rebers' 
motion was framed as a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. (R. 81). 
In response to the opposition, the Rebers filed a reply memorandum and an 
accompanying affidavit of ErlandReber (the "Reber Affidavit"). (R. 123-150). The 
Reber Affidavit attached additional documents outside the pleadings, including certain 
invoices from Sony to Visual Technology during this period. The reply memorandum 
also attached additional corporate documents pertaining to Visual Technology's 
corporate structure. (R. 144-150). Sony subsequently moved to strike the objectionable 
portions of the Rebers' reply memorandum as well as the Reber Affidavit, or in the 
alternative, requested discovery on all related issues of fact. (R. 171-172). Sony renewed 
these objections at oral argument held on November 6, 2002. (R. 308 at 9-11) 
On September 25, 2003, Judge Leslie Lewis entered an order granting the Rebers' 
Motion to Dismiss. (R. 291). The trial court specifically noted that it was declining to 
treat the Rebers' motion as a motion for summary judgment, and, as such, its decision 
would be based solely on the allegations of Complaint and its accompanying exhibits. 
(R. 289; see also R. 308 at 7). Although Rule 12(b)(6) requires the court to accept the 
8 
allegations of the Complaint as true, Judge Lewis entered "findings of fact" to support 
her decision. Specifically, paragraph 10 of the trial court's findings of fact concludes: 
This case does not involve a change in the financial structure or 
organization of the debtor which is the subject of the Guaranty, Visual 
Technology (I). It involves a new debtor altogether, Visual Technology 
(II), which was not covered by the Guaranty in the first place. 
(R. 290) Judge Lewis based this finding on the fact that Visual Technology had a 
different address and signatory listed in the Reseller Agreement than in the Guaranty and 
Security Agreement. (Id.) Based on these findings of fact, Judge Lewis concluded that 
the Visual Technology owned by Bruce Jackson was a different entity than the company 
owned by the Rebers, and that as such, the Rebers could not be held liable for the debts 
that Visual Technology owed to Sony. (R. 290-291) 
The trial court's order was entered on September 25, 2003, and Sony filed its 
Notice of Appeal on October 24, 2003. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting the Rebers' motion to dismiss on two separate 
grounds. First, the trial court erred by making findings of fact rather than accepting the 
allegations of Sony's Complaint as true, as required under Rule 12(b)(6). Sony's 
Complaint adequately pled a claim against the Rebers for breach of contract. As such, it 
was inappropriate for the trial court to issue findings of fact, and to rely on those findings 
in dismissing Sony's Complaint as a matter of law. Moreover, based only on the 
Complaint the trial court could not have concluded that Visual Technology was a 
different entity than the company owned by the Rebers and identified in the Guaranty. 
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Based on material outside the Complaint, the trial court concluded that the Rebers had 
guaranteed the debts of separate corporate entity because the company changed its 
business address and corporate signatory. Sony respectfully submits that this finding is in 
error as there could be any number of legitimate explanations for Visual Technology's 
change of address and change of its authorized officers. It simply does not follow, as a 
matter of law, that a debtor's change of address or corporate signatory creates an entirely 
different company. Further, to the extent the Court deemed these facts dispositive, Sony 
should have been allowed to conduct discovery to explore the circumstances surrounding 
these changes, or amend its complaint to state alternative claims. 
Second, the trial court's conclusion is also clear error. Utah law, including 
Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 1982) and Mule-Hide Products 
Co., Inc. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, 40 P.3d 1155, unequivocally recognizes that a 
continuing guaranty remains in effect until revoked in writing by the guarantor. In 
addition, both the express language of the Guaranty and Utah case law recognize that a 
guaranty remains enforceable despite any subsequent changes in the debtor's name, 
location, or corporate structure. Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that, as a 
matter of law, the Rebers cannot be held liable under the Guaranty. 
In light of the trial court's clear errors, Sony requests that the judgment be 
reversed, and that the case be remanded to the lower court with instructions to enter a 
judgment finding that the Rebers' Guaranty is enforceable as a matter of law. At a 
minimum, Sony should be allowed to conduct discovery regarding the Rebers' asset sale, 
and if appropriate, amend its complaint to assert additional causes of action. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Sony's Complaint Under Rule 12(b)(6) 
Because the Claims were Properly Pled and There were Insufficient Facts to 
Support the Trial Court's Conclusion that the Rebers Guaranteed a Debt of a 
Company Other Than Visual Technology, Inc. 
It is well-established under Utah law that "[a] dismissal is a severe measure and 
should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief 
under any state of facts which may be proved in support of its claim." Mackey v. 
Cannon, 2000 UT App 36, | 9, 996 P.2d 1081, 1084 (citing Colman v. Utah State Land 
Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the appellate 
court "'must consider all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Id. (citing Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). Thus, "[a] motion to dismiss is properly granted 
only in cases in which, even if the factual assertions in the complaint were correct, they 
provided no legal basis for recovery.'" Id. at f 13 (citing Lower v. Sorenson Research 
Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 670 (Utah 1989)) (emphasis supplied). 
In this case, dismissal of Sony's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was inappropriate 
because the Complaint adequately pled a claim against the Rebers. To state a claim for 
breach of contract under Utah law, a plaintiff must allege: (i) the existence of a contract; 
(ii) performance by the plaintiff; (iii) non-performance by the defendant; and (iv) 
damages. Id. Sony's Complaint meets all of these elements. The Complaint alleges that 
the Guaranty constitutes a valid and binding contract, that Sony performed under the 
agreement by shipping goods on credit to Visual Technology, that the Rebers failed to 
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perform by failing to pay after Visual Technology defaulted, and that Sony was 
monetarily damaged as a result. (R. 4-5). Thus, the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to 
state a claim against the Rebers for breach of contract, and the trial court erred by 
granting the Rebers' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Mackey, 2000 UT App 
36 at f 13. 
Rather than accepting as true the allegations of Sony's Complaint, the trial court 
drew its own factual conclusions from other pleadings and submissions. Specifically, the 
trial court made a finding of fact that Visual Technology, as operated by Bruce Jackson, 
was an entirely different corporate entity than the Visual Technology owned by the 
Rebers. (R. 290) Judge Lewis based this finding on the fact that the address for Visual 
Technology listed on the Reseller Agreement was different than the address listed in the 
Guaranty, and the fact that Sony sent its correspondence to Bruce Jackson, rather than the 
Rebers. (Id.) The trial court is not permitted to reach its own factual conclusions 
contrary to the allegations of the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and for 
this reason alone, the trial court's decision must be reversed. See Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 
UT 3, T{ 15, 65 P.3d 1184, 1188 (reversing trial court for relying on factual determination 
in ruling on motion to dismiss). 
Moreover, even if the trial court was permitted to consider factual submissions 
outside the Complaint, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial 
court's factual conclusion. A court considering a motion to dismiss must view the facts 
and any inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mackey, 
2000 UT App 36, f 9. Here, Judge Lewis concluded that Sony knew it was conducting 
12 
business with an entirely different corporate debtor and based this conclusion solely on 
the fact that Visual Technology changed its business address and signatory over the 
course of a fifteen year business relationship. This rationale is flawed. There are 
numerous legitimate explanations why the company would change location (such as 
moving to a better location, a more favorable lease / rental rate, additional retail space, 
etc.), none of which necessitate a change in corporation ownership or structure.7 
Similarly, for a variety of valid business reasons, corporations routinely change 
signatories, or for that matter, authorize more than one signatory (i.e., death of an officer, 
convenience, unavailability of a director or officer, etc.). When viewing the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no way that the trial court 
could have properly concluded as a matter of law that Sony was dealing with a 
completely different corporate entity based solely upon a change in address or a change 
in corporate signatory. 
Further, if the trial court was of the view that these facts, if true, were dispositive, 
it should have denied the motion to dismiss and allowed the parties to conduct discovery. 
Rule 12(b) unequivocally provides: 
If, on a motion ... to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon which relief can granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
Indeed, the facts of this case demonstrate that a change in location occurred when the 
Rebers owned the business. In 1986, at the time the Rebers signed the Security 
Agreement, the business was located at 2141 S. Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. By 
the time the Rebers signed their Guaranty in 1989, Visual Technology had moved its 
offices to 2155 S. Main. Interestingly, Rebers do not suggest that this change in location 
affected the enforceability of the Security Agreement or the Guaranty. 
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shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such motion by Rule 56. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has routinely 
acknowledged that when matters outside the pleadings are presented, as in this case, Rule 
12(b) requires that opposing parties be afforded an adequate "opportunity to submit 
supporting materials." Strand v. Associated Students, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977); 
see also Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 753 (Utah 1996) (finding trial 
court abused discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff to file supplemental affidavit in 
response to issues presented in reply). 
Hypothetically, if Sony had been permitted to conduct discovery, it would have 
been able to explore the facts and circumstances surrounding Visual Technology's 
change in address and corporate signatory. Sony could then have identified the reasons 
for these changes, which may have contradicted the trial court's assumption that Visual 
Technology was a different corporate debtor. For example, if discovery had been 
permitted, Sony may have been able to demonstrate that the Rebers consented to 
o 
"Dunston-Hill" / "Visual Technology's" corporate name change , or perhaps personally 
benefited from the fact that the name change may have deceived the company's 
creditors9. These facts would have rebutted the trial court's conclusion, or in the 
alternative, may have provided Sony with a basis for amending its Complaint to include 
o 
Since Rebers owned Visual Technology, Dunston-Hill could not have used the same 
name without consent. 
9
 Since the Rebers were to be paid over time, it was in their personal financial interest to 
assist Dunston-Hill to avoid any disruption of the business as would have occurred if 
creditors were notified of the change. 
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claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, or breach of the 
Security Agreement's notice covenants. Sony, however, was not given any opportunity 
to explore the circumstances surrounding the Rebers undisclosed sale of Visual 
Technology's assets, and, therefore, it was unable to marshal evidence to defend its 
Complaint. The trial court's decision to rely on certain factual findings in dismissing the 
Complaint, without allowing Sony a full opportunity for factual rebuttal, was error and 
the judgment should be reversed. 
II. The Guaranty is Enforceable as a Matter of Law. 
In addition to its procedural errors, the trial court misinterpreted Utah law. Even 
assuming Rebers' untested assertions of fact regarding Visual Technology's asset sale are 
true, the Rebers remained liable for Visual Technology's debts to Sony because they 
failed to revoke the Guaranty. Under Utah law, the Reber's Guaranty is a "continuing 
guaranty" because it is not limited in time and is intended to cover a series of transactions 
between Visual Technology and Sony. See, e.g., Cessna Finance Corp. v. Meyer, 575 
P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). A continuing guaranty remains effective until it is revoked 
in writing by the guarantor. Id.; see also Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 
741, 742 (Utah 1982) (finding statute of frauds requires that revocation of a guaranty be 
in writing); Mule-Hide Products Co. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, K 15 40 P.3d 1155, 1159 
("To revoke a continuing guaranty with respect to future transactions, the guarantor must 
notify the creditor of its intent to revoke.") In this regard, Utah law is not unique, but 
conforms to the general rule. See, e.g., Fairview Block & Supply Corp. v. Miscione, 563 
15 
N.Y.S.2d 375, 376; (N.Y. 1990); Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, 504 P.2d 807, 
809 (Idaho 1972); Bledsoe v. Cargill 452 So.2d 1334, 1336-37 (Ala. Ct. App. 1984) 
The policies underlying this rule are well-established. Creditors like Sony rely on 
the continued validity of their documentation in extending credit to small businesses and 
individuals. Mule-Hide, 2002 UT App 1, If 14 n.6. Creditors routinely obtain personal 
guaranties in order to secure payment of corporate debt, realizing a corporate debtor may 
often be judgment proof under corporate law principles. As guarantors, the Rebers had it 
within their power to revoke the Guaranty at any time. Doing so would have put Sony on 
notice of a change in its credit risk and, at that point, Sony could have made an informed 
decision about whether to continue extending credit to Visual Technology without a 
guaranty, request a new guaranty from other individuals, or discontinue the credit 
relationship altogether. Instead, the Rebers - who had knowledge of situation and the 
power to change it - elected to remain silent.10 See Mountain States, 504 P.2d at 809 
(finding guarantor in effect "concealed a material fact" by failing to notify creditor or 
revoke his guaranty). 
Here, it is undisputed that the Rebers never revoked the Guaranty, and never 
provided Sony with any notice suggesting that they would no longer be liable for the 
debts of Visual Technology. Unable to contest their liability under the Guaranty, the 
10
 Indeed, silence may have been financially advantageous to the Rebers. The Sale 
Agreement indicates that the Rebers would be paid the purchase price over a 10 year 
period through a promissory note. By preserving Visual Technology's existing 
relationships with its vendors and creditors, it was easier and more likely for the business 
to succeed and in turn more likely that the business would be able to pay the note. 
Because discovery was not permitted, Sony was never allowed to explore these 
circumstances. 
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Rebers argue that the debtor was a "different" Visual Technology from the "Visual 
Technology" whose debts they guaranteed. The Court must reject this argument because 
Utah law distinctly provides that a change in a corporate debtor's ownership does not 
affect the liability of a guarantor. 
The most recent Utah case to address this issue is Mule-Hide Products, Inc. v. 
White, 40 P.3d 1155 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). In Mule-Hide, the defendant, Christine 
White, acted as the sole proprietor of Allied Building Components ("Allied"). Id. at 
1157. Allied purchased goods on credit from Mule-Hide, and White executed a personal 
guaranty in favor of the creditor. Id. Several years later, White sold Allied's assets to 
another business, Case Roofing Supply ("Case"). Id. The trial court found that White 
had not informed Mule-Hide of the sale, nor did she revoke her guaranty. Id. Although 
Case was a separate legal entity, Case continued to purchase goods from Mule-Hide 
using Allied's invoices. Case subsequently failed to pay Mule-Hide for the goods it 
purchased, and Mule-Hide sued White to enforce its guaranty. Id. 
Based on these facts, White argued that she could not be held personally liable on 
the purchases made by Case, because she had not contractually guaranteed to pay for 
Case's debts. Id. at 1158. The trial court found, however, and this Court affirmed, that 
White was indeed liable because she had failed to revoke her guaranty. Id. at 1159. 
More importantly, this Court held that White was still liable under the guaranty 
regardless of a substantial change in the debtor's financial structure or organization. Id. 
at 1160. In particular, the Court found that absent revocation, the creditor had a right to 
rely on the White's continuing guaranty in shipping its goods. Id. at 1159. 
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A second Utah case, Zions First National Bank v. Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031 (Utah 
1977), is similarly instructive. In Hurst, the guarantor was an officer and shareholder of 
the debtor corporation. Id. at 1032. Approximately one year after the guaranty was 
executed, the defendant's status as a corporate officer was terminated and his stock 
holdings significantly reduced. Id The defendant, however, failed to revoke his 
guaranty, and did not inform the creditor of the change in his corporate status. Id. at 
1032-33. Given these circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court held that the guaranty was 
effective until revoked by written notice, and that the defendant was liable on the 
underlying debt despite the change in corporate management. Id at 1033; see also 
Cessna, 575 P.2d 1048. The law of other jurisdictions is in accord. See, e.g., Loving & 
Associates v. Carothers, 619 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (merger did not release 
guarantor from contractual obligation); Sun Bank / Treasure Coast v. Goldman, 580 
So.2d 291 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (guarantors liable on corporate debt following merger and 
subsequent asset transfer); Farmer v. Peoples American Bank, 209 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1974) (stockholder liable on guaranty following change in corporate ownership). 
The law discussed in Mule-Hide and Hurst is decidedly on-point. In addition, the 
language of Guaranty itself further supports a judgment against the Rebers. Paragraph 3 
of the Guaranty clearly provides: 
This Guaranty shall be effective regardless of any subsequent 
incorporation, reorganization, merger or consolidation of the Debtor, 
change of partners, change of name or any other change in the composition, 
nature, personnel or location of the Debtor. 
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Thus, in negotiating their agreement, the parties specifically anticipated that the Rebers 
might one day wish to change their corporate structure or operations, and provided that 
the Guaranty would continue to remain effective despite this change. Sony had a 
contractual right to rely on the plain language of Guaranty in selling goods to Visual 
Technology. It had a right to expect that the Rebers would fulfill their obligations in the 
event Visual Technology defaulted. As such, this Court should find that the Guaranty is 
enforceable against the Rebers as a matter of law, and remand the case to the trial court 
with a directive to declare that the Guaranty is enforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in dismissing Sony's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). As 
demonstrated above, the trial court failed to accept Sony's well-plead allegations as true, 
and, instead, improperly relied upon its own unsupported findings of fact. To the extent 
these facts, if true, would have been outcome determinative, the trial court erred in 
denying Sony the opportunity to conduct discovery. Further, even if the Rebers' 
assertions of fact are true, the trial court misapplied Utah law. Under Mule-Hide 
Products and related cases, the Rebers' Guaranty remained in effect until revoked in 
writing, notwithstanding any changes in the debtor's name, location, or corporate 
structure. Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that the Rebers cannot be held liable 
under the Guaranty. 
Sony requests that the judgment of the trial court be reversed, and that the case be 
remanded to the lower court with instructions to enter a judgment finding that the Rebers' 
Guaranty is enforceable as a matter of law. In addition, Sony should be permitted to 
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conduct discovery regarding the circumstances surrounding the Rebers' asset sale, and if 
appropriate, seek amendment of its complaint to assert additional causes of action. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 2004. 
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